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Abstract 
Emotions are commonly experienced and expressed in human societies; however, 
their consequences on economic behaviour have received only limited attention. This 
paper investigates the effects of induced positive and negative emotions on 
cooperation and sanctioning behaviour in a one-shot voluntary contributions 
mechanism game, where personal and social interests are at odds. We concentrate on 
two specific emotions: anger and happiness. Our findings provide clear evidence that 
measures of social preferences are sensitive to subjects’ current emotional states. 
Specifically, angry subjects contribute, on average, less than happy subjects and 
overall welfare as measured by average net earnings is lower when subjects are in an 
angry mood. We also find that how punishment is used is affected by moods: angry 
subjects punish harsher than happy subjects, ceteris paribus. These findings suggest 
that anger, when induced, can have a negative impact on economic behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
Emotions are pervasive in many social environments and interactions, characterising 
key aspects of our everyday relations. For instance, the experience and display of 
emotions play an important role in fostering and maintaining cooperative 
relationships, even when contracting is not complete or even absent (Fessler and 
Haley, 2003 and Bowles and Gintis, 2005). In psychology, there is a long tradition of 
investigating moods and emotions1 suggesting that humans often make different 
decisions depending on their current feeling states due to the use of different 
processing strategies (Bless et al. 1996; Schwarz and Clore, 1996), cognitive 
capacities (Isen, 1987; Mackie and Worth, 1989) or mood maintenance motivations 
(Isen, 1987; Wegener et al., 1995). Previous psychological research also reveals an 
association between emotions and normative judgments and decisions (for reviews, 
see Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 1990 and Loewenstein and Lerner, 2002). The relevance 
of emotions has been emphasised from an evolutionary perspective as well. For 
example, Frank (1988) argues that natural selection has favoured those whose 
decisions are influenced by emotions. Relatedly, it has been suggested that individuals 
displaying positive emotions increase their reproductive success, as they are more 
attractive to other members of the society (see Fredrickson, 2005). By contrast, the 
role of emotions has been largely neglected in traditional economic decision-making 
theories. Mostly, these theories assume economic agents to be fully–rational, self–
interested, emotionless maximizers of expected utility. This consequentialist 
framework does not need to be devoid of emotions as one could incorporate expected 
emotions that are anticipated to occur as the result of the outcomes of different 
choices into a theoretical model. However, expected emotions are not the only 
channel through which emotions can affect choices (see Rick and Loewenstein, 
2008). Immediate emotions, experienced at the moment of choice, are a bigger 
challenge to the consequentialist framework and have received less attention.   
This paper uses experimental methods and techniques from social psychology to 
shed light on our understanding of the causal link between immediate emotions and 
behavioural outcomes in public good games with and without punishment. Public 
1 Psychologists usually make a distinction between moods (which are typically long-lasting states) and 
emotions (which are typically short-lived states). They also used the term “affect” which normally 
encapsulates both emotions and moods (Forgas, 1992). Yet, in this paper, we are not concerned with 
making such a distinction and therefore use these terms interchangeably. It is also worth noting that the 
procedures used to induce moods and emotions are practically the same (for a brief discussion, see 
Fredrickson, 2005). 
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good games have long been studied in the social science literature (e.g. Andreoni, 
1988; Ostrom et al., 1992; Isaac et al., 1994; Brandts and Schram, 2001; Coats et al., 
2009; and Ostrom and Vollan, 2010) as they capture the tension between personal 
interest and social benefit which characterises many real life social dilemmas. In their 
very nature, dilemmas are loaded with emotions. The most effective way of analyzing 
the causal effect of immediate emotions is to experimentally manipulate emotions by 
inducing them. 
In this paper, we design an experiment to investigate the impact of induced 
emotions on two behavioural measures of social preferences: cooperation and 
sanctioning behaviour. We examine the issue of how induced emotions affect 
behaviour in a game that has played a major role in the social preference literature: 
the voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) with punishment.2 In our 
implementation of this game, individuals randomly form groups of 3 members and 
decide how much of their initial endowment to voluntarily contribute to a common 
resource. The setup is parameterised such that selfish and rational individuals would 
contribute nothing and keep their whole endowment for themselves; whereas social 
efficiency is achieved when all individuals contribute their total endowment to the 
common good. The game is completed with the addition of a second stage in which 
individuals are informed about the contributions of the other group members and are 
given the opportunity to reduce the income of their counterparts by assigning costly 
sanctioning points to other group members.3 The game is played only once providing 
us with a cleaner test for the initial existence of the effects of induced emotions on 
behaviour. We concentrate on two emotional states: anger and happiness, which are 
two of the six so-called “primary or universal” emotions (see Damasio, 1994).4 We 
induce these emotions by showing short video clips to participants before they make 
their contribution decision.  
2 In the past, psychological experiments have explored the impact of induced emotions on cooperation 
(e.g., Hertel and Fiedler, 1994; Hertel et al., 2000). However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous 
experiment explores the behavioural consequences of induced emotions on cooperation in an incentive 
compatible environment. Additionally, we extend the literature by assessing the extent to which 
negative reciprocity (as measured by individuals’ willingness to punish) is sensitive to subjects’ current 
affective states. 
3 The voluntary contribution mechanism with punishment we examine was first introduced by Fehr and 
Gächter (2000) and since then, a growing body of experimental literature has emerged investigating the 
ability of punishment to sustain high cooperation levels and to regulate self-interested behaviour (for 
reviews, see Gächter and Herrmann, 2009; Chaudhuri, 2011). 
4 The other four such emotions are sadness, fear, surprise and disgust. 
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Our main findings suggest that induced emotions play a significant role in 
shaping behaviour in the voluntary contribution mechanism with and without 
punishment. In particular, angry subjects contribute significantly less than happy 
subjects.  They also tend to punish their counterparts harsher (when we control for 
deviations from the punisher’s contribution behaviour) compared to subjects in a 
happy mood. Overall welfare is also affected by induced emotions: average earnings 
are significantly lower for angry subjects than for happy subjects. To this extent, we 
provide evidence that anger, when induced, causes a negative impact on economic 
behaviour and reduces efficiency at least in the very short run. 
This paper contributes to the emerging literature that sheds empirical light on 
the forces that determine the content of acceptable standards of behaviour. Most 
studies have focused on whether and how self-reported emotions are correlated with a 
broad range of economic behaviours (see, e.g., Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Sanfey 
et al., 2003; Xiao and Houser, 2005; Meshulam et al., 2011; Bolle et al., 2014; 
Stanton et al., 2014). Related to this paper, there exists evidence based on correlations 
for the role played by emotions in both cooperation and punishment decisions. For 
instance, Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009) have shown the importance of emotions in 
the decision to cooperate in a two-period game involving two players. Other studies 
have shown that positive (negative) emotional states are associated with higher 
(lower) contributions in a VCM context (Joffily et al., 2014). As for the decision to 
punish, some studies have suggested that negative emotions such as anger predict the 
application of costly punishment (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Fehr and Gächter, 
2000; Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; Ben Shakhar et al., 2007; 
Andrade and Ariely, 2009; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009; Cubitt et al., 2011; Joffily 
et al. 2014; Dickinson and Masclet, 2015). However, the emotions studied in these 
papers are coming about endogenously either through initial dispositions or through 
the observation of choices made in the experiment. The originality of this paper is that 
emotions are induced exogenously using video clips. This allows for a causal 
attribution that is lacking in previous studies.5 
5 There are a few notable exceptions that report causal effects of induced emotions. These include 
effects on altruistic behaviour in dictator games (Capra, 2004), overbidding in an auction environment 
(Capra et al., 2010), labour productivity (Oswald et al., 2015), generosity in a gift-exchange game 
(Kirchsteiger et al., 2006) and time preferences (Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2011). 
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Our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the experimental design 
and procedures. Section 3 states the hypotheses and Section 4 presents the 
experimental results. Section 5 discusses the findings and concludes. 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
2.1 Voluntary contributions mechanism with punishment 
Our experimental design centres on a game with two stages. In the first stage subjects 
are randomly assigned to a three-person group. Each subject is endowed with 20 
tokens and has to decide how many of them to keep and how many to contribute to 
the public good (described as a “project” to subjects).  Each token kept increases the 
own monetary payoff by one experimental currency unit (ECU). Each token 
contributed to the public good increases the payoff of every group member by 0.5 
ECUs. The payoff function from the first stage is given by equation (1). 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
1 = 20 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 0.5 ⋅ �𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗=1 �,      (1) 
 
where 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 (0 ≤ 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 ≤ 20) denotes the number of tokens contributed to the public good 
by group member 𝑖𝑖. 
In the second stage subjects can see the profile of contributions of the other two 
group members and are given the opportunity to assign costly punishment points to 
each of the other two group members. Subjects could assign up to 5 punishment 
points. Each punishment point costs the punisher 1 ECU and the recipient of the 
punishment 3 ECUs. Thus, the cost-to-impact ratio is 1:3. The total payoff from both 
stages is computed as follows: 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 − 3 ⋅ ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 ,       (2) 
 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖1 denotes group member 𝑖𝑖’s payoff from the first (contribution) stage and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
the punishment points group member 𝑖𝑖 assigns to group member 𝑗𝑗. 
Conditional on each subject i being motivated to maximise equation (2), the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium requires that subjects free-ride completely in the 
first stage and refrain from punishing in the second stage. 
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2.2 Design and procedures 
We implement a 2x2 factorial between-subject design. One factor that we manipulate 
is subjects’ emotions; we either induce them to be positive or negative.  The other one 
is the announcement of a second stage punishment phase, which is either announced 
or not at the beginning of the experiment.  Table 1 summarizes the experimental 
treatments.  
 
Table 1. Experimental treatments 
 Without 
Announcement 
With  
Announcement 
Positive emotions 111 48 
Negative emotions 117 54 
Note: Numbers in the cells indicate the number of subjects who participated in each treatment. 
 
We induce positive and negative emotions by exposing subjects to scenes from 
short video clips. There is a large body of literature in psychology on mood induction 
procedures. These, for example, include the imagination of emotionally driven events, 
the use of emotional statements whereby subjects are asked to try and feel the 
associated mood, the presentation of mood-suggestive stories, video clips and music, 
the receipt of positive/negative feedback on task performance, the exposition of 
certain social interactions, the exchange of gifts and the use of different facial 
expressions.6 The motivation for using video clips as our mood-generating process 
stems from psychological studies suggesting that short films have one of the highest 
success rates in inducing moods in laboratory experiments and that they minimise 
experimenter demand effects (e.g. Clark, 1983; Martin, 1990).7 
For the “Positive emotions” treatment, our aim was to induce the emotion of 
happiness. For this purpose, we showed subjects a short video clip from the movie 
“Mr. Bean’s holiday” (filmed in 2007) where the main character of the movie is street 
dancing in order to earn some money to continue his vacations. For the “Negative 
emotions” treatment, our aim was to induce the emotion of anger. In this case, we 
showed subjects a short video from the movie “My Bodyguard” (filmed in 1980) 
6 For a meta-analysis of these procedures, see Westermann et al. (1996). 
7 To reduce the presence of potential demand characteristics, we also avoided the use of accompanying 
instructions and cover stories for the video clips.  
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where a young boy comes to a new school and gets harassed by a bully.8 After mood 
induction had taken place, subjects were given a list of thirteen emotions.  They were 
asked to indicate the intensity with which they felt each emotion. The intensity for 
each emotion was recorded on a 9-point scale (1 = “not at all”, …, 9 = “very much”). 
All subjects in an experimental session watched the same video clip (individually on 
their computers with headphones on) and all were informed that everybody watched 
the same video. 
We additionally manipulate whether the content of the second (punishment) 
stage is announced to subjects at the beginning of the experiment. Previous literature 
(e.g. Gächter and Hermann, 2009) has shown that announcing punishment increases 
contributions even in a one-shot VCM game. However, we do not know whether this 
effect is the same (in direction or magnitude) in situations when positive or negative 
emotions are induced. Therefore, comparing contributions when a punishment stage is 
announced with contributions when such a stage is not announced allows us to isolate 
the effect that induced emotions have on contributions. We refer to the resulting 
treatments as “Without Announcement” and “With Announcement.” In the “Without 
Announcement” treatment, subjects were informed that the experiment consists of 
two stages, but they were not told what will happen in the second stage. In the “With 
Announcement” treatment, subjects participated in a standard VCM game with 
punishment as they were informed from the beginning of the experiment about the 
content of both the first and the second stage.9 This design allows us to test whether 
contribution and punishment behaviour are affected by induced emotions of happiness 
and anger (controlling for the announcement of the punishment stage) which is the 
main research question of this paper. 
8 Previous research has established the emotional effects of this video clip. For a classification of 
movies which induce particular emotions, see Gross and Levenson (1995). 
9 In order to eliminate the potential effect of the announcement of a punishment stage on contributions, 
one could either eliminate the second stage altogether or inform subjects about the fact that there will 
be a second stage without informing them about the content of that stage. We are not aware of any 
study that compares behaviour in these two situations and therefore conduct both, one which consists 
of one stage only (120 subjects in total, with 60 induced to be happy and 60 induced to be angry) and 
one which consists of two stages where participants know that there will be two stages but the content 
of the second stage is only announced at the beginning of the second stage (108 subjects in total, with 
51 induced to be happy and 57 induced to be angry). As we do not find differences in contributions 
between such one stage and two stage VCM games, for a given mood induction, we pool the data from 
these games and refer to them as “Without Announcement.” This leads to the higher numbers for this 
treatment seen in Table 1. 
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Each subject was assigned at random to a group of three members and sessions 
were randomly allocated to treatments. Subjects played a one-shot voluntary 
contributions game under one of these treatments. 
 
Procedures: All subjects were recruited at the University of Birmingham, using the 
ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015) and the experiment was computerized and 
programmed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the end of each 
session, subjects were privately paid according to their total amount of experimental 
currency units (ECUs), using an exchange rate of £0.35 per ECU. Average earnings 
(excluding a show-up fee of £2.50) were £7.38. Sessions lasted 70 minutes, on 
average. Before subjects played the game, they received the instructions reproduced 
in Appendix A. As we wanted to ensure that subjects understood the decision 
situation and the mechanics of payoff calculations, all participants answered several 
control questions. The experiment did not proceed until every subject had answered 
these questions correctly. 
3. Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses address the impact of induced anger and happiness on 
contribution and punishment behaviour. Starting with contribution behaviour, the null 
hypothesis is that our mood manipulation has no effect on contribution levels. 
However, existing laboratory evidence (e.g., Capra, 2004; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006; 
Capra et al., 2010) suggests that subjects who are in a negative mood exhibit less 
altruistic or helpful behaviour. Motivated by this evidence, our alternative hypothesis 
is that subjects’ contribution behaviour is affected by induced emotions. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Induced emotions affect subjects’ contribution behaviour. 
 
Looking at punishment behaviour, we use the notion of the “punishment function” 
which gives the punishment points assigned by the punisher as a function of the 
recipient’s deviation from the punisher’s contribution. Previous evidence (e.g. Fehr 
and Gӓchter, 2000; 2002) suggests that the punishment function is downward sloping 
for the negative part of the deviation (horizontal) axis, implying that a subject 
punishes her co-player more, the more he negatively deviates from the punisher’s 
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contribution. Regarding how the punishment function changes with respect to moods, 
our null hypothesis predicts that the punishment function does not depend on subjects’ 
moods, ceteris paribus. In principle, the punishment function for the “Negative 
emotions” treatment can be shifted either upwards or downwards relative to the 
“Positive emotions” treatment.10 However, guided by evidence from psychology (for 
a survey, see Zizzo, 2004) suggesting that anger can translate itself into aggressive 
behaviour, we anticipate that the “punishment function” exhibits differences in 
intercept and/or slope across different moods. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Induced emotions affect subjects’ punishment behaviour. 
4. Results 
4.1 Mood induction 
This section presents the findings from the mood induction procedure. Recall that in 
the “Positive emotions” treatment, we wanted to induce the emotion of happiness; 
whereas, in the “Negative emotions” treatment, we wanted to induce the emotion of 
anger. Our analysis is therefore centred on the examination of these two emotions.11 
We record intensities of emotions on a scale from 1 (“no intensity at all”) – 9 
(“highest possible intensity”). Table 2 reports the average happiness and anger in the 
different treatments. 
We observe that the highest (lowest) levels of happiness are recorded in the 
“Positive (Negative) emotions” treatment. The mirror image of this observation is 
portrayed when we examine the emotion of anger. Specifically, the emotion of anger 
takes the lowest values in the “Positive emotions” treatment and the highest values in 
the “Negative emotions” treatment. When we perform non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests, we find that the differences in emotions across treatments are statistically 
10 Note that we consider the punishment function for the “Positive emotions” treatment as the baseline 
in relation to which the punishment function for the “Negative emotions” treatment shifts. The reason 
for doing so is that the former punishment function is not statistically significantly different from a 
comparable punishment function (in which no emotions were induced) estimated in a paper by Cubitt 
et al. (2011) who used a UK subject pool and implemented similar parameters for the VCM games to 
the ones we use here. We formally compare these two punishment functions in Section 4.3. 
11 Figure B.1 and Table B.1 in Appendix B summarize the intensity of all thirteen emotions that we 
elicit after subjects watched the movie clip. As is common in studies of induced emotions, inducing a 
single emotional feeling is virtually impossible as several emotional responses are correlated with one 
another (for example happiness and joy, sadness and anger). 
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significant. Namely, happiness (anger) is significantly higher (lower) in the “Positive 
emotions” treatment relative to the “Negative emotions” treatment, regardless of the 
treatment (for all pairwise comparisons, p=0.000).12 Our conclusion is that our mood 
induction technique was successful in making subjects happier or angrier in the 
respective treatments. 
 
Table 2. Average self-reported happiness and anger 
  Average 
happiness 
Average  
anger 
Without  
Announcement 
Positive 
emotions 
6.97 
(1.44) 
1.59 
(1.49) 
Negative 
emotions 
1.97 
(1.55) 
6.62 
(1.94) 
With  
Announcement 
Positive 
emotions 
6.69 
(1.99) 
1.40 
(0.92) 
Negative 
emotions 
1.91 
(1.43) 
6.09 
(1.99) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. The intensity of emotions was recorded on a 9-point scale (1 
= “not at all”, …, 9 = “very much”). 
 
We next explore whether these temporary changes in subjects’ moods bring 
about differences in their contribution and punishment behaviour. 
4.2 Contribution behaviour 
Table 3 shows the average contribution levels disaggregated by treatment.13,14 Using a 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we find that subjects contribute less in the “Negative 
emotions” treatments both in the “Without Announcement” (p=0.091) and in the 
“With Announcement” treatment (p=0.098). We also find that, for a given mood 
treatment, whether the content of the second stage is announced or not makes a 
12 All tests reported in the paper are two-sided. 
13 The distribution of individual contributions in each of the four treatments is shown in Figure B.2 in 
Appendix B. 
14 It is worth noting that when happy emotions are induced, we observe similar contribution levels to 
those recorded in one-shot public good games where no particular emotion is induced. For example, 
our mean contribution rates in the “Without Announcement / Positive emotions” treatment are similar 
to those reported in comparable treatments by Gächter and Hermann (2009) who used a Russian 
subject pool, Dufwenberg et al., (2011) who used a German subject pool and Cubitt et al. (2011) who 
used a UK subject pool. More specifically, comparing contributions in our “Without Announcement / 
Positive emotions” treatment (average 6.19) with those observed in the one-shot VCM without 
punishment of Cubitt et al. (average 5.88) shows no significant difference (Wilcoxon rank-sum test; 
p=0.705). The same holds when we compare contributions in our “With Announcement / Positive 
emotions” treatment (average 9.81) with those observed in the comparable one-shot VCM with 
punishment of Cubitt et al. (average 7.21, Wilcoxon rank-sum test; p=0.134). 
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significant difference in subjects’ contribution behaviour. Specifically, subjects 
contribute more in the treatments where the punishment stage is pre-announced both 
in “Positive emotions” treatment (p=0.004) as well as in the “Negative emotions” 
treatment (p=0.008). This is in line with earlier findings showing that punishment is 
an effective tool of social sanctioning capable of inducing higher cooperation (e.g., 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000; 2002). 
 
Table 3. Average contribution levels for each treatment 
 Without 
Announcement 
With  
Announcement 
Positive emotions 6.19 (6.06) 
9.81 
(7.20) 
Negative emotions 4.91 (5.79) 
7.41 
(6.10) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
We further explore the determinants of contribution behaviour by performing 
Tobit regressions as contributions are restricted to take on values between 0 and 20. 
We report the results of three models in Table 4. In all models, the dependent variable 
is the amount of tokens a subject contributes to the public good. Model (1) directly 
tests for treatment differences by including as explanatory variables the two treatment 
variables: “Negative emotions” and “With Announcement.” In addition, we control 
for gender. Models (2) and (3) are based on the directly elicited emotions, which take 
into account the fact that individuals may respond differently to the mood induction. 
By including elicited emotions, we capture the behaviour of the “less happy” subjects 
in the “Positive emotions” treatment and the “happier” subjects in the “Negative 
emotions” treatment in addition to the induced “happy” and “less happy” subjects in 
the respective treatments. This allows us to draw a more general conclusion that is not 
dependent on a specific movie. As can be seen in Figure B.1 and is usually observed 
in studies that employ the induction of emotions, more than one emotion is triggered. 
In order to allow for the effects of a more complex index, we construct two mood 
indices: “positive index” and “negative index.” These indices are derived using factor 
analysis on all thirteen elicited emotions.15 This enables us to construct indices with 
variables that measure similar things, thereby reducing the large set of variables (most 
15 We conduct the factor analysis separately for the “Positive emotions” and “Negative emotions” 
treatment since different emotions are triggered in each treatment. 
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of which are correlated to each other) to a smaller set. As a result, the “positive index” 
is the average of warmth, happiness and joy; whereas the “negative index” consists of 
the average of anger, fear, sadness and irritation.16 We additionally control for the 
“With Announcement” treatment and gender. Model (2) only includes the “negative 
index”, whereas Model (3) additionally includes the “positive index.” 
 
Table 4. Determinants of contribution behaviour – Regression results 
 Dependent variable:  
Contribution by subject i 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Negative emotions -2.465** (1.125) 
  
Negative index  -0.592** (0.236) 
-0.768* 
(0.416) 
Positive index   -0.194 (0.368) 
With Announcement 5.284*** (1.241) 
5.160*** 
(1.237) 
5.105*** 
(1.251) 
Female 2.020* (1.127) 
1.953* 
(1.116) 
1.890* 
(1.125) 
Constant 3.368*** (1.116) 
4.449*** 
(1.326) 
5.987* 
(3.291) 
Observations 330 330 330 
Notes: Tobit estimates. The variable “Negative emotions” is a dummy variable for the treatment which 
takes on the value “1” for the “Negative emotions” treatment and “0” for the “Positive emotions” 
treatment. The variable “Positive index” is the average of warmth, happiness and joy; whereas the 
variable “Negative index” consists of the average of anger, fear, sadness and irritation. The variable 
“With Announcement” is a dummy variable for the treatment which takes on the value “1” for the 
“With Announcement” treatment and “0” for the “Without Announcement.” The variable “Female” is 
a dummy variable which takes on the value “1” if a subject is female and “0” if a subject is male.  
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** 
denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
Table 4 confirms the main findings from the non-parametric analysis. 
Specifically, we find that the coefficients “Negative emotions” in Model (1) and 
“Negative index” in Models (2) and (3) enter the respective regression with a negative 
sign (statistically significant at either 5% or 10%). This indicates that subjects who 
exhibit a high intensity of negative emotions (amongst them anger) contribute less 
tokens to the public good. In addition, the treatment variable “With Announcement” is 
positive and highly significant in all models, implying that the announcement of the 
punishment stage leads individuals to contribute higher amounts as observed in 
16 If, instead of the mood indices, we include the directly elicited emotions of “Happiness” and “Anger” 
we find similar results (see Appendix B, Table B.2). 
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previous experiments (e.g. Fehr and Gӓchter, 2000). We additionally find that women 
marginally contribute more. This adds to the mixed previous findings of women 
contributing more (e.g. Seguino et al., 1996) as opposed to men contributing more 
(e.g. Brown-Kruse and Hummels, 1993, Sell and Wilson, 1991). 
 
RESULT 1. Average contributions are affected by moods: subjects contribute 
significantly less in the “Negative emotions” treatment than in “Positive emotions” 
treatment. Subjects also contribute significantly higher amounts when the punishment 
stage has been announced irrespective of induced emotions. 
4.3 Punishment behaviour 
We start our analysis by examining subjects’ punishment behaviour for each 
treatment. Figure 2 shows the punishment points assigned by the punisher to another 
player 𝑗𝑗 as a function of j’s deviation from the punisher’s contribution.17 The 
punishment function is given by the solid line, which indicates the fitted line of the 
locally weighted regression of punishment assigned to the deviation from the 
punisher’s contribution. 
 A visual inspection of Figure 2 suggests that subjects punish negative 
deviations from the punisher’s contributions harsher than non-negative deviations as 
has been found in previous studies (e.g. Fehr and Gӓchter, 2000). We also observe 
that subjects typically do not punish those who have contributed more than the 
punisher. However, Figure 2 shows that such anti-social punishment happens 
sometimes, especially in the “Negative emotions” treatments. The average 
punishment points assigned in each treatment are reported in Table 5.18 
 The main message from Table 5 confirms our observation that negative 
deviations are punished more harshly than positive deviations.19 There seems to be an 
increase in assigned punishment points in the “Negative emotions” treatments. 
However, this increase is only statistically significant for anti-social punishment (i.e. 
17 We refer to the punisher as player 𝑖𝑖 and the recipient of punishment as player 𝑗𝑗. 
18 The data reported in Table 5 is “clustered” at the individual level since each subject makes two 
punishment decisions. In the case that the two punishment decisions are both based on the same 
direction of deviation (i.e. both deviations are either non-negative or both are negative), we use the 
average of the two as the unit of observation; otherwise, we use the individual decisions.  
19 Pairwise comparisons of assigned punishment points for negative vs. non-negative deviations for a 
given emotions treatment using Wilcoxon rank-sum tests confirm statistical significance in all 
treatments at p<0.005. 
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non-negative deviations) in the “With Announcement” treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test; p=0.089). It has to be noted that observed relative frequencies of anti-social 
punishment are very low. Only 3.4% of non-negative deviations are punished in the 
“With Announcement / Positive emotions” treatment. When negative emotions are 
induced and punishment has been announced, this anti-social punishment increases to 
12.5% (Test of Equality of Proportions, p=0.073).20 
 
Figure 2. Punishment as a function of deviation from punisher’s contribution 
 
  
Table 5. Average punishment points for each treatment 
 Negative Deviations Non-negative deviations 
Without 
Announcement 
With 
Announcement 
Without 
Announcement 
With 
Announcement 
Positive 
emotions 
0.54 
(0.88) 
0.87 
(1.13) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
Negative 
emotions 
0.89 
(1.20) 
1.14 
(1.63) 
0.20 
(0.93) 
0.16 
(0.44) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Our analysis so far does not control for the magnitude of deviations which is 
likely to be a determinant of how punishment is assigned (as suggested by previous 
20 The specific test statistic is Z = (p1−p2)/Spc, where pi is the proportion of zero choices in subsample 
i. Spc is an estimate of the standard error of p1 − p2, Spc = {pc(1 − pc)[(1/N1) + (1/N2)]}^0.5. pc is an 
estimate of population proportion under the null hypothesis of equal proportions, pc = (p1N1 + 
p2N2)/(N1 + N2), where Ni is the total number of all choices in subsample i. 
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public goods experiments with punishment). To test econometrically whether (a) the 
intercept of the punishment function and (b) the slope of the punishment function are 
different across mood treatments, we estimate Tobit regression models. The reason 
for performing a Tobit analysis is that our dependent variable, which is “punishment 
assigned by player i to player j,” exhibits censoring at 0 and 5. In our regression 
models, we cluster at the individual level and include as independent variables: 
“Player j’s absolute negative deviation,” “Player j’s positive deviation,” and the 
dummy variables “Negative emotions,” “With Announcement” and “Female.” In 
Model (1), we do not include interaction terms for the most conservative estimation of 
the model. In Model (2), we include two interaction terms, which indicate whether the 
slope of the punishment function differs with respect to negative and positive 
deviations across mood treatments. Note that all deviations are calculated with respect 
to the punisher’s contribution. We include “absolute negative deviation” and “positive 
deviation” as separate regressors, since these two different sorts of deviation elicit 
different punishment responses as shown in Figure 2 and Table 5. The variable 
“absolute negative deviation” is the absolute value of the actual deviation of subject 
j’s contribution from the punisher’s contribution, when subject j’s contribution is 
below the punisher’s contribution; and zero otherwise. The variable “positive 
deviation” is constructed in an analogous way. The variable “Group average 
contribution” indicates the average contribution of all three members in a group. Note 
that we do not include the directly elicited emotions or the constructed mood indices 
because the decision to punish can be affected by two sources of emotions: (1) the 
experimentally induced emotions prior to the contribution decision, and (2) the 
emotions experienced after observing the contributions of the other two group 
members. The directly elicited emotions only account for the first source of emotion 
as emotions are elicited before contributions are made. The regression results are 
given in Table 6. 
Table 6 reveals two important observations. First, as anticipated, we find that 
negative deviations from the punisher’s contribution are a significant determinant of 
how punishment is used: a subject punishes another group member more, the less this 
group member contributes relative to the punisher. By contrast, positive deviations are 
not punished significantly as the coefficient of the respective variable is insignificant 
at conventional levels. Second, the coefficient of the dummy variable “Negative 
emotions” has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level in Model 
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(2). This implies that the intercept of the punishment function is different across our 
mood treatments if we simultaneously allow for the possibility of a slope difference.  
 
Table 6. The punishment function – Regression results 
 Dependent variable:  
Punishment assigned by  
player i  to player j  
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Group average contribution 0.011 (0.087) 
0.022 
(0.092) 
Player j’s  absolute negative 
deviation from punisher’s 
contribution 
0.240*** 
(0.060) 
0.333*** 
(0.098) 
Player j’s  positive deviation from 
punisher’s contribution 
-0.094 
(0.076) 
-0.043 
(0.138) 
Negative emotions 0.885 (0.659) 
1.930** 
(0.983) 
Negative emotions × Player j’s  
absolute negative deviation from 
punisher’s contribution 
 -0.158 (0.122) 
Negative emotions treatment × 
Player j’s  positive deviation from 
punisher’s contribution 
 -0.092 (0.160) 
With Announcement 0.777 (0.666) 
0.730 
(0.670) 
Female -0.272 (0.622) 
-0.307 
(0.617) 
Constant -4.574*** (1.064) 
-5.191*** 
(1.279) 
Observations 420 420 
Notes: Tobit estimates. The variable “Group average contribution” indicates the average contribution 
of all three members in a group. The variable “Absolute negative deviation” is the absolute value of 
the actual deviation of subject j’s contribution from the punisher’s contribution, when subject j’s 
contribution falls below the punisher’s contribution; and zero otherwise. The variable “positive 
deviation” is constructed analogously. The variable “Negative emotions” is a dummy variable which 
takes on the value “1” for the “Negative emotions” treatment and “0” for the “Positive emotions” 
treatment. The variable “With Announcement” is a dummy variable which takes on the value “1” for 
the “With Announcement” treatment and “0” for the “Without Announcement.” The variable 
“Female” is a dummy variable which takes on the value “1” if a subject is female and “0” if a subject 
is male. Robust standard errors (clustered at the individual level) are presented in parentheses. ** 
denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
 In addition, the coefficients of the interaction terms between positive/absolute 
negative deviations and the dummy variable “Negative emotions” are statistically 
insignificant suggesting that the slope of the punishment function across our emotions 
treatments does not differ. Therefore, the observed difference in how subjects assign 
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punishment points is due to a level difference of the punishment function between the 
“Negative emotions” and the “Positive emotions” treatment.21 
 
RESULT 2. The assignment of punishment is affected by moods: subjects punish 
harsher in the “Negative emotions” treatment than in the “Positive emotions” 
treatment, for given deviations from the punisher’s contribution. 
 
4.4 Average earnings 
Our findings from the previous section suggest that when subjects are in a negative 
mood, they punish more harshly compared to those subjects in a positive mood. We 
therefore examine whether being in a negative mood is detrimental for subjects’ 
overall welfare as measured by subjects’ net earnings. Table 7 gives a breakdown of 
the earnings by treatment.22 We separate total earnings (i.e. earnings from both 
stages) into earnings after contribution (i.e. earnings from the first contribution stage 
only) and punishment costs (i.e. costs associated with assigning and receiving 
punishment). 
By performing non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, we find that subjects’ 
earnings after the contribution stage do not differ significantly between the “Positive 
emotions” treatment and the “Negative emotions” treatment (Without Announcement: 
p=0.760; With Announcement: p=0.317). However, total earnings are significantly 
lower in the “Negative emotions” treatment relative to the “Positive emotions” 
treatment when the content of the second stage is announced ex ante (p=0.005). This 
is not the case otherwise (p=0.262). The significant difference is due to the fact that 
subjects punish more heavily in the “Negative emotions” treatment than in the 
“Positive emotions” treatment when the content of the second stage is announced as 
can be seen in the higher associated punishment costs.  
21 Notice that, as stated in Section 3, we take as our baseline category the punishment function of the 
“Positive emotions” treatment to which the punishment function of the “Negative emotions” treatment 
is compared. Comparisons between our data and the data from the Cubitt et al. (2011) do not indicate 
significant differences between our “Positive emotions” punishment function and their punishment 
function when no emotions are induced. Our regression analysis from this comparison is reported in 
Appendix B (see Table B.3). Using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we also do not find statistically 
significant differences in average punishment points assigned, in total, (p=0.712) as well as with 
respect to negative (p=0.866) and non-negative deviations (p=0.485). 
22 Note that, for our analysis on earnings, we only consider the treatments which have a second 
punishment stage. 
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 Table 7. Breakdown of earnings by treatment 
 Without Announcement With Announcement 
 Positive 
emotions 
Negative 
emotions 
Positive 
emotions 
Negative 
emotions 
Total earnings 20.52 (4.43) 
18.77 
(7.00) 
22.24 
(5.82) 
18.67 
(6.25) 
Earnings after 
contribution 
22.64 
(4.65) 
22.28 
(5.60) 
24.91 
(5.88) 
23.70 
(5.67) 
Punishment 
costs 
2.12 
(4.89) 
3.51 
(7.71) 
2.67 
(4.62) 
5.04 
(8.87) 
Note: Earnings are measured in ECUs. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table 8. Earnings – Regression results 
 Dependent variable: 
Logarithm of earnings for subject 𝒊𝒊 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Negative emotions -0.210*** (0.060) 
-0.192** 
(0.089) 
With Announcement 0.048 (0.063) 
0.067 
(0.050) 
Negative emotions × 
With Announcement  
-0.037 
(0.121) 
Female -0.046 (0.062) 
-0.046 
(0.062) 
Constant 3.029*** (0.048) 
3.020*** 
(0.046) 
Observations 210 210 
Notes: OLS estimates. The variable “Negative emotions” is a dummy variable which takes on the value 
“1” for the “Negative emotions” treatment and “0” for the “Positive emotions” treatment. The 
variable “With Announcement” is a dummy variable which takes on the value “1” for the “With 
Announcement” treatment and “0” for the “Without Announcement”. The variable “Female” is a 
dummy variable which takes on the value “1” if a subject is female and “0” if a subject is male.  
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** 
denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
We further test parametrically whether earnings differ across our mood 
treatments by performing two OLS regressions. In both models the dependent variable 
is the logarithm of total earnings that a subject receives. The independent variables 
that are common to both models are the dummy variables “Negative emotions”, 
“With Announcement” and “Female” as defined earlier. Model (2) is augmented by 
including an interaction term between the dummy variables “Movie” and “With 
Announcement.” The regression results are given in Table 8. 
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The regression results from Table 8 suggest that subjects in the “Negative 
emotions” treatment earn significantly less than those in the “Positive emotions” 
treatment. Taken together, our findings indicate that induced anger is detrimental and 
reduces efficiency at least in the very short run. A similar observation of the short run 
detrimental effect of punishment without induced emotions has been made by Gӓchter 
et al. (2008) who compare the effects of punishment in a ten period public good game 
with those in a fifty period public good game. 
 
RESULT 3. Average earnings (when there is a punishment stage) are affected by 
moods: subjects earn significantly less in the “Negative emotions” treatment than in 
“Positive emotions” treatment. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper presents an experimental investigation of the impact of induced anger and 
happiness on shaping economic behaviour in relation to human cooperation. Our 
framework is a standard voluntary contributions mechanism with punishment, which 
has played a key role in the social preference literature. This set-up encompasses a 
broad range of real-world contexts and situations that epitomize the conflict of 
interests between personal and collective goals. Its study is therefore of great 
importance as it enables us to understand the proximate sources behind human 
cooperation. Our interest is on two behavioural measures of social preferences: 
contribution and sanctioning behaviour. Our main findings show that both of our 
measures are affected by individuals’ emotional states. Specifically, induced anger 
leads individuals to be less pro-social by contributing on average lower amounts to 
the common resource. In addition, controlling for deviations from the punisher’s 
contributions, we find that average punishment is harsher when subjects are in an 
angry emotional state. On average, total efficiency as measured by average net 
earnings is also lower for angry subjects compared to happy ones.  
We contribute to the literature in at least two important ways. First, from a 
theoretical perspective, we show that aspects of the environment such as induced 
emotions affect economic behaviour. Our findings, hence, provide further evidence 
for inspiring theory development that can account for mood effects. 
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Second, from an empirical perspective, it is already well-understood that 
sanctioning and emotions are associated in social environments similar to the one we 
examine: negative emotions are triggered when fairness norms are violated. Namely, 
in public good games with punishment, negative deviations from the punisher’s 
contributions cause strong negative emotions such as anger which serves as a 
motivating factor that increases the willingness of subjects to punish norm violators. 
As a result, sanctioning (albeit costly) leads to higher contribution levels even in one-
shot contexts or in situations where reputation gains have been removed (e.g., Fehr 
and Gächter, 2002; Gächter and Hermann, 2009; Cubitt et al., 2011). In other words, 
acting on feelings of anger has a positive impact on fostering cooperation.  In this 
paper, we provide evidence that anger when induced can have detrimental effects on 
economic outcomes: angry subjects contribute lower amounts to the public good and 
earn less.  Negative reciprocity is also sensitive to the feeling of anger as it affects 
how subjects perceive a given contribution level. Specifically, punishment is harsher 
when subjects are in an angry mood, for given deviations from the punisher’s 
contribution level. Overall, we find that the immediate impact of induced anger on 
behaviour is harmful at least in the very short run.  
Our study gives rise to a number of different future research avenues. The role 
of emotions needs to receive more attention in economic analysis as their effects 
remain to be a challenge to rational decision-making theories. In particular, more 
empirical evidence is necessary to better understand the channels through which 
induced emotions affect behaviour. Our observation that angry subjects contribute 
less could be the result of a change in social preferences or a change in beliefs about 
the behaviour of others. In our study, we collect non-incentivised data on beliefs 
about others’ contributions. Preliminary analysis of these data suggests that beliefs 
about others’ contributions are not affected by moods.23 Given that contributions are 
affected by moods, this makes angry subjects appear as if they are not best-responding 
to their beliefs. This seeming disconnect between beliefs and reality might be because 
of an approach motivated wish/desire “I hope the other people give more (perhaps) I 
23 After subjects had made their own contribution decision, we asked them to state their beliefs about 
contributions of the other group members. We did not want these belief elicitations to interfere with the 
incentive structure of the voluntary contribution mechanism by creating income effects and opted to 
not pay for correct beliefs. We also wanted to avoid punishment being motivated by disappointment 
about low payoffs resulting from inaccurate beliefs.  
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deserve it.”24 This conjecture needs to be further investigated in a more systematic 
way.  
It would also be interesting to isolate the effects induced emotions have on the 
punishment decision per se. It has to be noted that the reduction in contributions can 
be directly attributed to the induced emotions. However, the resulting punishment 
decisions could have two emotional sources: an exogenous one through the mood 
induction procedure and an endogenous one through observing other participants’ 
choices. Disentangling these mood effects and measuring their respective weight 
would aid in understanding the behavioural consequences of induced emotions 
relative to the causes of emotions which are a central theme in psychology. 
Finally, we focus on the effects of induced emotions in a one-shot interaction 
game. Yet, the persistence of this effect is of great relevance, especially in the light of 
our evidence that the fitness of human societies is sensitive to specific emotions such 
as anger. The long-run impact of emotions on economic behaviour is important to be 
quantified as it will improve our understanding of the survival and success of human 
societies.  
  
24 For evidence of anger being an approach motivated affect see the survey of Carver and Harmon-
Jones (2009). 
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Appendix A. Experimental Instructions 
[Note: These are the written instructions as presented to subjects facing the “With 
Announcement” treatments. Amendments to the “Without Announcement” treatments 
are given in square brackets.] 
Instructions 
 
Welcome to the Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory. This is an 
experiment in decision making. The University of Birmingham has provided funds for 
this research. Just for showing up you have already earned £2.50. You can earn 
additional money depending on the decisions made by you and other participants. It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. 
 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you 
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be 
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of 
these rules. 
 
We will first jointly go over the instructions. After we have read the instructions, you 
will have time to ask clarifying questions. Each of you will then need to answer a few 
brief questions to ensure everybody understands. We would like to stress that any 
choices you make in this experiment are entirely anonymous. Please do not touch the 
computer or its mouse until you are instructed to do so. Thank you. 
 
In the instructions, unless otherwise stated, we will not speak in terms of Pounds, but 
in terms of Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). Your entire earnings will, thus, be 
calculated in ECUs. At the end of the session the total amount of ECUs you have 
earned will be converted to Pounds at the following rate: 1 ECU = 0.35 Pounds. The 
converted amount will privately be paid to you in cash. 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. At the beginning of the experiment, participants 
are divided into groups of three. You will therefore be in a group with 2 other 
participants. At no point during the experiment, nor afterwards will you be informed 
about the identity of the other participants in your group and the other participants 
will never be informed about your identity. 
[“Without Announcement” treatments: The experiment consists of two parts. Below 
we will detail the instructions for Part 1. You will receive new instructions for Part 2 
once everyone in the room has completed Part 1. At the beginning of the experiment, 
participants are divided into groups of three. You will therefore be in a group with 2 
other participants. At no point during the experiment, nor afterwards will you be 
informed about the identity of the other participants in your group and the other 
participants will never be informed about your identity.] 
 
Detailed Information about the Experiment 
 
Part 1 
 
At the beginning of the experiment each of you receives 20 tokens. We call this your 
endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide 
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how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to a project and how many of them 
to keep for yourself. The two other members of your group have to make the same 
decision.  
 
Every token that you do not contribute to the project automatically belongs to 
you and earns you one ECU. 
 
For the tokens contributed to the project the following happens: The total 
contributions to the project will be calculated by adding up all individual 
contributions of the group members. This total will then be multiplied by 1.5 and 
this amount will be divided equally among all three members of the group. For 
example, if 1 token is contributed to the project, the project’s value increases to 1.5 
ECUs. This amount is divided equally among all three members of the group. Thus 
every group member receives 0.5 ECUs. 
 
Your income therefore consists of two parts: 
 
(1) The tokens which you have kept for yourself (“Income from retained tokens”) 
whereby 1 token = 1 ECU. 
(2) The “Income from the project”. This income is calculated as follows:  
Your income from the project = 0.5 times the total contributions to the project.  
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, 
i.e., each group member receives the same income from the project.  
 
Your total income in ECUs is therefore: 
 
(20 – tokens contributed to the project by you) + 0.5*(sum of all tokens 
contributed to the project by all members of your group) 
 
 
When making your decision, the following input-screen will appear: 
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As mentioned above, your endowment in the experiment is 20 tokens. You have to 
decide how many tokens you contribute to the project by typing a number between 0 
and 20 in the input field. This field can be reached by clicking it with the mouse. By 
deciding how many tokens to contribute to the project, you automatically decide how 
many tokens you keep for yourself. After entering the amount of tokens you 
contribute you must press the O.K. button using the mouse. Once you have done this, 
your decision can no longer be revised.  
 
After that, you will be informed about the amount of tokens you contributed to the 
project, the individual amount of tokens each member of your group contributed, the 
sum of tokens contributed to the project, your total income and the income of the 
other group members.  
 
[“Without Announcement” treatments: Do you have any questions? Please raise your 
hand and an experimenter will come to your desk. Please do not ask any question out 
loud.  
 
Once everybody has correctly answered the control questionnaire, we would like you 
to watch a short video clip, which will be the same for all participants in this session. 
After the end of the video clip, you will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire and 
then be asked to make the decisions for the experiment.] 
 
 
Part 2 
 
During this part, after seeing how many tokens each of the other two group members 
has contributed to the project and his or her corresponding income from Part 1, you 
can either decrease or leave unchanged the income of each other group member by 
assigning negative points to them. The other group members can also decrease your 
income, by assigning negative points to you, if they wish to do so. 
 
You will see the following input screen in Part 2: 
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You must decide how many negative points to assign to each of the other two group 
members. In the second row you can see your contribution and your income from Part 
1. In the other two rows, you can see the same information for each of the two other 
members of the group.  
 
If you do not wish to change the income of a specific group member then enter 0 in 
the box for that group member. If you do wish to decrease a group member’s income, 
enter instead the number of negative points that you wish to assign to them, preceded 
by a minus sign (without spaces between them).  For example, to assign 2 negative 
points to a group member, type -2 in the relevant box.  You can move from one input 
field to the other by pressing the tab -key (→) or by using the mouse. You must 
enter a response in each box. 
 
You can assign between 0 and 5 negative points to each one of the two other 
group members. 
 
Assigning negative points is costly. Each negative point that you assign costs you 
one ECU.  Thus, the total cost to you in ECUs of assigning negative points to other 
group members is given by the total number of negative points that you assign.  Until 
you press the OK-button, you can still change your decision.  
 
The effects of assigning negative points to other group members are as follows:  If 
you give 0 points to a particular group member, you will not have any effect on his or 
her income. However, for each negative point that you assign to a particular 
group member, you will decrease their income by 3 ECUs (unless their income is 
already exhausted).  For example, if you give a group member 2 negative points (i.e., 
enter –2), you will decrease their income by 6 ECUs. And so on. 
 
Your own income will be decreased by 3 ECUs for each negative point that is 
assigned to you by the other two group members, except that, if all of your income 
from the first part is exhausted as a result of negative points assigned to you, your 
income cannot be reduced any further by other group members.  Therefore, your total 
income from the two parts is calculated as follows: 
 
 
Total income (in ECUs) after part 2 
 
        = income from Part 1                                        (1) 
          – 3*(sum of negative points assigned to you)    (2) 
                       – costs of negative points assigned by you                
 
if (1) + (2) is greater than or equal to 0; 
 
 
                       = 0 – costs of negative points assigned by you     
 
if (1) + (2) is less than 0 
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Please note that your income in ECUs after Part 2 can be negative, if the cost of 
negative points assigned by you exceeds your income from Part 1 less any reduction 
in your income caused by negative points assigned to you by other group members.  If 
this is the case, your show-up fee of £2.50 will be used to cover the losses.  
 
Do you have any questions? Please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to 
your desk. Please do not ask any question out loud.  
 
Once everybody has correctly answered the control questionnaire, we would like you 
to watch a short video clip, which will be the same for all participants in this session. 
After the end of the video clip, you will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire and 
then be asked to make the decisions for the experiment. 
 
Control Questionnaire 
 
For the following questions assume that each group member has an endowment of 20 
tokens. 
 
1. Suppose that nobody (including yourself) contributes any token to the project. 
What is: 
 
 Your income ?........... 
 The income of the other group members?........... 
 
2. Suppose that everybody (including yourself) contributes 20 tokens to the project. 
What is: 
 
 Your income?........... 
 The income of the other group members?........... 
 
3. Suppose that one group member contributes 0, the other one contributes 10 and 
you contribute 20 tokens.  
 
 a) What is your income?........... 
 b) What is the income of the person who contributed 10? ........... 
 c) What is the income of the person who contributed 0? ........... 
 
4. In the second part, one group member assigns the following negative points to the 
other two group members: -2 and -4. What are the total costs of the assigned negative 
points?........... 
 
5. What are your costs if you assign a total of 0 points?........... 
 
6. By how many ECUs will your income from the first part be changed if you receive 
a total of 0 negative points from the other group members?........... 
 
7. By how many ECUs will your income from the first part be changed if you receive 
a total of 4 negative points from the other group members?........... 
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Appendix B. Additional data illustrations and analyses 
 
Figure B.1. Mean intensities for all emotions 
 
Note: Data presented for “Without Announcement” include observations for the “1 stage” as well as 
the “2 stage” treatments. 
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Table B.1. Mean intensities for all emotions 
 Without Announcement With Announcement 
 Positive 
emotions 
treatment 
Negative 
emotions 
treatment 
Positive 
emotions 
treatment 
Negative 
emotions 
treatment 
Warmth 6.54 
(1.65) 
2.07 
(1.45) 
6.60 
(1.82) 
2.44 
(1.82) 
Anger 1.59 
(1.49) 
6.62 
(1.94) 
1.40 
(0.92) 
6.09 
(1.99) 
Fear 1.54 
(1.37) 
3.54 
(2.28) 
1.17 
(0.63) 
3.26 
(1.89) 
Envy 2.11 
(1.70) 
1.79 
(1.55) 
1.77 
(1.56) 
1.69 
(1.13) 
Sadness 2.40 
(1.64) 
6.15 
(2.21) 
2.31 
(1.84) 
6.30 
(2.03) 
Happiness 6.97 
(1.44) 
1.97 
(1.55) 
6.69 
(1.99) 
1.91 
(1.43) 
Shame 1.71 
(1.18) 
4.25 
(2.56) 
1.44 
(1.22) 
4.04 
(2.21) 
Irritation 2.44 
(1.91) 
6.59 
(2.23) 
2.21 
(1.69) 
6.46 
(2.24) 
Contempt 3.19 
(2.45) 
4.38 
(2.64) 
3.04 
(2.64) 
3.85 
(2.60) 
Guilt 1.68 
(1.38) 
2.83 
(2.27) 
1.56 
(1.25) 
3.04 
(2.08) 
Joy 6.32 
(1.91) 
1.62 
(1.19) 
5.98 
(2.34) 
1.69 
(1.24) 
Jealousy 1.81 
(1.47) 
1.50 
(1.23) 
1.58 
(1.44) 
1.5 
(1.04) 
Surprise 5.28 
(2.49) 
4.13 
(2.35) 
4.38 
(2.79) 
4.63 
(2.32) 
Note: Data presented for “Without Announcement” include observations for the “1 stage” as well as 
the “2 stage” treatments. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Figure B.2. Distribution of contribution levelsB1,B2 
 
 
 
  
B1 Free-riders: The percentage of free-riders does not significantly differ across the emotions 
treatments (“Without Announcement” treatments: “Negative emotions” 42.74% vs.  “Positive 
emotions” 35.14%, Test of Equality of Proportions, z=1.18, p=0.238; “With Announcement” treatment: 
“Negative emotions” 22.22% vs.  “Positive emotions” 16.67%, Test of Equality of Proportions, z=0.71, 
p=0.478). 
B2 Full contributors: The percentage of full contributors is significantly lower in the “Negative 
emotions” treatment (9.26%) than in “Positive emotions” treatment (22.92%) (Test of Equality of 
Proportions, z=-1.89, p=0.059). For the “Without Announcement” treatments, the percentage of full 
contributors does not vary substantially (“Negative emotions” 4.27% and “Positive emotions” 5.41%, 
respectively, Test of Equality of Proportions, z=-0.40, p=0.689). 
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Table B.2. Determinants of contribution behaviour – Regression results 
 Dependent variable:  
Contribution by subject i 
Happiness -0.299 (0.327) 
Anger -0.578* (0.318) 
With Announcement 4.968*** (1.276) 
Female 1.848 (1.138) 
Constant 5.937** (2.958) 
Observations 330 
Notes: Tobit estimates. The variables “Happiness” and “Anger” are the directly elicited emotions of 
happiness and anger, respectively, recorded on a 9-point scale (1 = “not at all”, …, 9 = “very 
much”). The variable “With Announcement” is a dummy variable which takes on the value “1” for the 
“With Announcement” treatment and “0” for the “Without Announcement”. The variable “Female” is 
a dummy variable which takes on the value “1” if a subject is female and “0” if a subject is male.  
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** 
denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
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Table B.3. Differences between our “Positive emotions” and Cubitt et al.’s 
punishment function – Regression results 
 Dependent variable:  
Punishment assigned by player i  to 
player j  
Group average contribution 0.006 
(0.066) 
Player j ’s  absolute negative deviation 
from punisher’s contribution 
0.408*** 
(0.145) 
Player j ’s  positive deviation from 
punisher’s contribution 
-0.020 
(0.157) 
Treatment -0.285 
(1.016) 
Treatment × Player j ’s  absolute 
negative deviation from punisher’s 
contribution 
-0.099 
(0.155) 
Treatment × Player j ’s  positive 
deviation from punisher’s contribution 
-0.005 
(0.182) 
Constant -4.023*** 
(1.101) 
Observations 282 
Notes: Tobit estimates. The variable “Group average contribution” indicates the average contribution 
of all three members in a group. The variable “Absolute negative deviation” is the absolute value of 
the actual deviation of subject j’s contribution from the punisher’s contribution, when subject j’s 
contribution falls below the punisher’s contribution; and zero otherwise. The variable “positive 
deviation” is constructed analogously. The variable “Treatment” equals 1 for the data used from our 
“Positive emotions” treatment and 0 for the data used from the corresponding Give-P treatment of the 
Cubitt et al. paper. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 
10-percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
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